It appears that the more “intellectually advanced” (less-Islamifucked) nations in the Middle East are finally starting to wake up and realize that Islamist politicians don’t care for the economy, and as such, they must be kicked out of politics.
(H/T Daniel Pipes)
The unrest marks a deeply important development with permanent implications. Turkey has become a more open and liberal country, one in which leaders face democratic constraints as never before. But how much it changes the role of Islam in Turkey depends primarily on the economy.
China-like material growth has been the main achievement of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the party he heads, the AKP. Personal income has more than doubled in the decade that he has been in power, changing the face of the country. As a visitor to Turkey since 1972, I have seen the impact of this growth in almost every area of life, from what people eat to their sense of Turkish identity.
That impressive growth explains the AKP’s increased share of the national vote in its three elections, from 34% in 2002 to 46% in 2007 to a shade under 50% in 2011. It also explains how, after 90 years of the military serving as the ultimate political power, the party was able to bring the armed forces to heel.
At the same time, two vulnerabilities have become more evident, especially since the June 2011 elections, jeopardizing Erdogan’s continued domination of the government.
Dependence on foreign credit. To sustain consumer spending, Turkish banks have borrowed heavily abroad, and especially from supportive Sunni Muslim sources. The resulting current account deficit creates so great a need for credit that the private sector alone needs to borrow $221-billion in 2013, or nearly 30% of the country’s $775-billionGDP. Should the money stop flowing into Turkey, the party (pun intended) is over, possibly leading the stock market to collapse, the currency to plunge, and the economic miracle to come to a screeching halt.
Erdogan’s sultan-like understanding of his democratic mandate. The prime minister sees his election — and especially the one in 2011, when the AKP won half the popular vote — as a carte blanche to do whatever he pleases until the next vote. He indulges his personal emotions (recall his confrontation with Shimon Peres in 2009), meddles in the tiniest matters (his deciding the use of a city park prompted the current turmoil), social engineers (telling married couples to bear three or more children), involves Turkey in an unpopular foreign adventure (Syria), and demonizes the half of the electorate that did not vote for him (calling them beer-guzzlers who copulate in a mosque). This attitude has won the fervent support of his once-downtrodden constituency, but also has wrought the fury of the growing numbers of Turks who resent his authoritarianism, as well as the criticism of Europe leaders. German Chancellor Angela Merkel pronounced herself “appalled” by the recent police crackdown.
Since the demonstrations started, the Istanbul stock market is down 10% and interest rates are up about 50%
These two weaknesses point to the importance of the economy for the future of Erdogan, the AKP and the country. Should Turkey’s finances weather the demonstrations, the Islamist program that lies at the heart of the AKP’s platform will continue to advance, if more cautiously. Perhaps Erdogan himself will remain leader, becoming the country’s president with newly enhanced powers next year; or perhaps his party will tire of him and — as happened to Margaret Thatcher in 1990 — push him aside in favour of someone who can carry out the same program without provoking so much hostility.
But if “hot money” flees Turkey, if foreign investors go elsewhere, and if Persian Gulf patrons cool on the AKP, then the demonstrations could end AKP rule and rupture the drive toward Islamism and the application of Islamic law. Infighting within the party, especially between Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, or within the Islamist movement, especially between the AKP and Fethullah Gulen‘s powerful movement, could weaken the Islamists. More profoundly, the many non-Islamist voters who voted for the AKP’s sound economic stewardship might abandon the party.
Payroll employment is down by 5%. Real consumer spending in first quarter 2013 fell by 2% over 2012. Since the demonstrations started, the Istanbul stock market is down 10% and interest rates are up about 50%. To assess the future of Islamism in Turkey, watch these and other economic indicators.